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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE OREGON TRAIL: A NEW PATH TO ENVIRONMENTALLY
RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?

JASON C. JONES*
INTRODUCTION
In today’s world, it is difficult to avoid the popular movement of going
“green.” To some, it seems as if every other commercial on television involves
a new green product and just about every other company is making an effort to
go green.1 In the last few years, environmentally and socially responsible
products have gained widespread popularity, fostered the growth of new
companies, and become significant profit centers for large corporations.2
While debates may rage about the wisdom and efficacy of specific
environmental or social policies, most agree that being environmentally and
socially responsible is normatively better.3

* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I thank Sarah D. Murphy for her
invaluable contributions and hard work on this Article.
1. See Stuart Elliott, Eco-Ads: The Aim Is to Say How They Save the World, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2006, at A11.
2. See Kelly Faircloth, Report: Consumers Still Shopping Green, INC.: THE DAILY
RESOURCE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.inc.com/news/articles/2009/02/
green.html; Nathanial Gronewold, Appeal of ‘Green Products’ Growing Despite Recession—
Survey, GREENWIRE, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.enn.com/lifestyle/article/39140; Joel Makower,
In Recession, Business Keeps Going Green, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2009/db2009022_982216.htm; Peter
L. Mosca, Green Design Elements as Profit Centers, REALTY TIMES, June 16, 2008,
http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20080616_greendesign.htm; Chris Reidy, Survey: Consumers
Continue to Buy Green Products, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/ticker/2009/02/consumers_conti.html; Kevin Voigt, Business
Sees Green in Going Green, CNN.com, Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/BUSINESS/
12/14/environment; Greg Zimmerman, The Rise and Significance of Eco-Labels and Green
Product Certifications, FacilitiesNet.com, July 2005, http://www.facilitiesnet.com/green/article/
Certified-Green--3087.
3. That is, few would likely argue that one should intentionally destroy the environment,
but debate may arise about whether a particular policy is warranted or wise. See David HahnBaker, “We Have Met The Enemy . . .” A Book Review of Sustainable America: America’s
Environment, Economy, and Society in the 21st Century, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 259, 264 (2000),
for more information about the moral responsibility of “sustainability,” from where that morality
is derived, and the notion that current unsustainable practices could be based on our moral
failings. See also Glenn Israel, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for
335
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In order to meet consumer demand, many companies4 have found
themselves not only creating green products, but also changing their corporate
lifestyle so that they, too, become environmentally and socially responsible.5
In fact, the desire to become green has resulted in the development of
publications, rankings, and standards that disseminate information to interested
consumers regarding the most green products and companies.6 Consumers
may use this information to discern among the many green products and green
companies to determine which gets their hard-earned dollar. Moreover, many
consumers take this green initiative to the proverbial next level and seek
environmentally and socially responsible companies to invest savings,
retirement, and investment dollars.7
It is easy to see why many companies feel the need to become, at least in
the eyes of the consumer, environmentally and socially responsible. There are
several ways to accomplish this goal. Most easily, businesses may create
products or otherwise conduct business in such a way that is considered
environmentally and socially responsible. But what if this is not enough?
Many believe that a shift in norms must occur in order to really address the
situation and give corporations the freedom to consider the environmental and
social effects of their decisions.8 The current perception is that a corporation’s
internal law protects shareholders and thus imposes a duty on the managers to
maximize the wealth of the shareholders.9 Therefore, the decision rule
becomes one that is focused on generating profit or shareholder wealth and any
focus on nonshareholder constituencies such as employees, the community, or

Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303, 303–04 (stating that green
marketing is a response to the consumer seeking green products); Paul H. Luehr, Guiding the
Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulating Environmental
Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 311, 312–13 (1992) (suggesting that consumers are
seeking environmentally safer products).
4. The term “companies” is used loosely and colloquially to accommodate both public and
private corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies.
5. Marc Gunther, Global Warming Could Melt Your Portfolio, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 21,
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/21/news/international/pluggedin_fortune/index.htm.
6. See, e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, http://www.sustainability-index.com/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2010); FTSE4Good Index Series, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_
Index_Series/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). The presence of sustainability rankings has
stimulated a desire for inclusion among companies. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and
the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 313 (2007).
7. See Trillium Asset Management, About Us, http://trilliuminvest.com/about/ (last visited
Jan. 11, 2010); Green Century Funds, History, http://www.greencentury.com/about/history/ (last
visited Jan. 11, 2010); Rebecca Clarren, Green Investing 101, SALON, Nov. 26, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/mwt/good_life/2007/11/26/green_investing.
8. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947,
960 (2008).
9. Id.
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the environment is ancillary at best. Professor Kent Greenfield recently
pondered whether the shifting of norms or the changing of the decision rule or
internal corporate law will lead corporations to internalize nonshareholder
interests.10 I would argue that the latter will accomplish the former, and a new
Oregon law (“Oregon Law”) would certainly be successful in this regard.11
The provision in the new Oregon Law, if enacted by corporations, is not
permissive12—unlike the various nonshareholder constituency statutes that
came before it.13 Should a corporation elect, vis-à-vis their articles of
incorporation, to make environmentally and socially responsible behavior the
controlling norm, they would be forced to consider these nonshareholder
interests.14
The question then becomes whether this is a necessary constraint on
corporate decision makers. As elaborated in a recent article by Professor Judd
Sneirson,15 whether a corporation has a duty to maximize profits, especially in
light of the business judgment rule, is questionable.16 Moreover, Professor
Sneirson suggests that, even if a corporation does have a duty to maximize
profits, there very well may be a direct correlation between profits and conduct
that is environmentally and socially responsible.17 Despite this, Professor
Sneirson, similar to the Oregon legislature, believes that a corporation should
do more than just act in an environmentally and socially responsible way—
incorporators should make environmentally and socially responsible behavior
the internal law or decision rule of the corporation.18 This paper argues that
such an election is unnecessary and could yield negative consequences.
First, corporations (including Oregon corporations) do not necessarily have
an enforceable duty to maximize shareholder wealth.19 This means that in
reality, changing the decision rule addresses a red herring. Even if such a
wealth-maximizing duty does exist, corporations that make environmentally
and socially responsible decisions despite their effect on profits are given
significant leeway to do so from the business judgment rule.20 Another major

10. Id.
11. See Act of June 1, 2007, 2007 Or. Laws 254 (creating new provisions for corporations).
12. Id.
13. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 9.02 at 14 (2002).
14. Act of June 1, 2007, 2007 Or. Laws 254.
15. Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009).
16. Id. at 1005. See infra Part II, for a more detailed discussion of profit maximization and
the business judgment rule.
17. Id. at 1010. See infra Part III.B, for a more detailed discussion of profit sustainability
and socially responsible behavior.
18. Sneirson, supra note 15, at 1017.
19. Id. at 995–96.
20. See infra Part II (discussing the business judgment rule).
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issue may come from the arduous task in reaching a singular, legal definition
of environmentally and socially responsible behavior. Decision makers who
follow this new decision rule may find themselves in some surprising
litigation.
Part I of this Article discusses whether the shareholder primacy norm
controls corporate decision-making, or whether the norm is enforced.
Assuming that the shareholder primacy norm is the guiding decision rule, Part
II discusses how the business judgment rule insulates decision makers from
liability when they ignore the norm. Part III then looks at the Oregon Law, and
the law’s viability as a solution to changing the (norm) decision rule of
shareholder primacy to include environmentally and socially responsible
conduct. Finally, Part IV concludes that changing the decision rule could lead
to potential pitfalls such as shareholder lawsuits.
I. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM
As explained in this section, the rationale for passing the Law was to free
decision makers to make environmentally and socially responsible decisions by
changing the decision rule (i.e. the shareholder primacy norm).21 As it turns
out, the shareholder primacy norm, while a “foundation stone in the corporate
governance system . . . is both unenforced and unenforceable.”22 Therefore, a
change in the decision rule is, perhaps, unnecessary.
A.

Norm Development

Economic scholars have often suggested that the business of business is to
make profit.23 The shareholder primacy norm derives from a board of
directors’ duty of care to the shareholders.24 This standard of corporate
governance can be traced back to the somewhat contested decision of Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co.25 The Dodge brothers, with a group of minority shareholders,
sued Henry Ford, the president and owner of 58% of capital stock in Ford
Motor Company.26 The Company was prospering—it had profits, assets, and a
surplus of almost $112 million, and about $54 million cash on hand.27 Henry
Ford’s testimony indicated that shareholders should be satisfied with the large

21. See infra Part III.A.
22. D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J.
985, 1002 (2008).
23. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 33.
24. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998).
25. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
26. Id. at 669, 671.
27. Id. at 683.
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dividends and gains previously dispensed to them by Ford Motor Company.28
Ford stated that “Ford Motor Company has made too much money, has had too
large [of] profits, and that, although large profits might be still earned, a
sharing of them with the public, by reducing the price of the output of
company, ought to be undertaken.”29 Consistent with this outlook, Ford Motor
Company failed to declare any special dividend during the business year.30
The Michigan court held that corporate directors have discretion to decide
whether to pay dividends, but that power is abused when there is a large
accumulation of surplus cash that is not needed for corporate business.31 The
court reasoned that the corporation’s purpose was to make profits for the
shareholder: “It is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others.”32 Thus, the
court focused on Ford’s purpose and stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to
33
devote them to other purposes.

Dodge spawned the famous debate between Professors Adolf Berle and
Merrick Dodd.34 In that debate, Professor Berle argues that:
[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation,
or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter
or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit
35
of all the shareholders as their interest appears.

Therefore, this shareholder primacy norm has developed from a duty to make
decisions in the best interests of the shareholders.36 The interpretation of this

28. Id.
29. Id. at 683–84.
30. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683.
31. Id. at 682.
32. Id. at 684.
33. Id.
34. See Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931)
[hereinafter Berle, Powers in Trust]; Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Merrick Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties
of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935).
35. Berle, Powers in Trust, supra note 34, at 1049.
36. Smith, supra note 24, at 278.
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duty, in following with Dodge,37 is that shareholder primacy means
shareholder wealth maximization.38
B.

Norm in Practice

According to some, “the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . has
been fully internalized by American managers.”39 Yet many sources offer
support for the notion that there is no corporate requirement to maximize
shareholder profits. Even Professor Stephen Bainbridge acknowledged that
“there are surprisingly few authoritative precedents on point.”40 As a general
illustration, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate
Governance provides a source of doctrinal authority.41 It states that the
corporation “should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”42 ALI’s use of
“enhance” serves as a critical contrast to “maximize,” as used by the court in
Dodge. Moreover, the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance provides
that the corporation “may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public
welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes” even if

37. Of course, others hold a countervailing viewpoint that Dodge only provides dicta
regarding a wealth maximization norm. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 167 (2008); Nathan Oman, Corporations
and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
101, 135–36 (2005); Sneirson, supra note 12, at 1002.
38. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133–34 (1962) (“Few trends could
so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate
officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as
possible.”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993) (arguing that
shareholder wealth maximization is the norm which guides corporate decision makers); Henry
Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439
(2001); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 177, 177 (2008); JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, ALAN R. PALMITER, & FRANK PARTNOY,
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIAL AND PROBLEMS 87 (6th ed. 2007); ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (“Although corporation statutes do not answer
this question explicitly, lawyers, judges, and economists usually assume that the more ultimate
purpose of a business corporation is to make profits for its shareholders.”); Robert Roman, Less is
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance,
18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 186 n.30 (2001); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 975 (1992).
39. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J.
CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996).
40. STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 410 (2002).
41. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE OBJECTIVE AND CONDUCT OF
THE CORPORATION § 2.01 (1992).
42. Id.
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corporate profit is not enhanced.43 ALI’s provision illustrates that a
corporation does not have a sole duty to maximize profits and can engage in
socially responsible conduct. As a result, we see that “even though the
shareholder primacy norm is closely associated with debates about the social
responsibility of . . . corporations, its impact on the ordinary business decisions
of such corporations is limited.”44
Furthermore, in Delaware, as concluded in Revlon v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,45 a corporation’s duty to maximize shareholder wealth
is limited in scope to situations involving buyout negotiations.46 The court in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,47 also stated that “absent a
limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors,
while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se
duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover.”48 Decided within a year of Revlon, the court in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum,49 required consideration of the effect of a takeover before
deciding on a bid.50 Such an analysis, as espoused by Unocal, includes
balancing the concerns, which may include “the impact on ‘constituencies’
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally).”51 Therefore, while “proponents of corporate
social responsibility have seized upon the shareholder primacy norm in the
belief that it is an important determinant of corporate decision making . . . [t]he
evidence, however, does not support that belief.”52 In fact, “as a practical
matter, courts will not interfere with corporate social responsibility because
there is almost always a plausible argument that actions considerate of a
corporation’s employees, customers, or creditors, or the environment, are in
the long-term interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”53

43. Id. § 2.01(b)(3). This provision of ALI’s Principles of Governance recognizes that a
corporation is a social as well as an economic institution, and there must be balance between a
corporation’s economic objective and their social needs. See id. at § 2.01 cmt. e.
44. Smith, supra note 24, at 280.
45. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
46. Id. at 184–85.
47. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
48. Id. at 1150.
49. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
50. Id. at 955.
51. Id.
52. Smith, supra note 24, at 323.
53. Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder,
10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 35 (2005).
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C. Oregon’s Law on a Corporation’s Duty to Maximize Profits
Oregon’s case law also lacks any type of direct standard requiring a
corporation to operate for the primary purpose of maximizing profits for the
shareholders.54 Likewise, Oregon’s state code follows the ALI’s language and
provides that a corporation may “[m]ake payment or donations or do any other
act, not inconsistent with law, that furthers the business and affairs of the
corporation.”55 It is not surprising that the Oregon courts apply the ALI’s view
because Organ lacks a law directly incorporating the shareholder primacy
norm and Oregon courts have found the ALI’s Principles of Corporate
Governance particularly important in considering other questions of corporate
law.56 The ALI states that a corporation’s objective should be to enhance
profit and shareholder gain, but with a restrained view that a corporation does
have the power to “devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
Thus, if a
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”57
corporation implements environmentally and socially responsible policies, its
actions would be quite reasonable given Oregon authority.
Instead of placing an emphasis on a legal standard for a corporation to
maximize profits, Oregon case law focuses on shareholder interests and the
obligation the corporation and its directors owe to shareholders. For example,
in Locati v. Johnson, the court lays out the general rule that a corporation’s
directors owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.58 The court defined a
fiduciary duty as one that seeks “the interest of the beneficiary rather than the
personal interest of the fiduciary . . . which might suggest that failing to seek
the interest of the minority is sufficient to show a breach of duty.”59 Therefore,
although Oregon law clearly indicates shareholder primacy through its law on
fiduciary duties, it goes no further than Professor Berle’s direction that the

54. See Hearing on H.B. 2826 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Leg. Assem. 1
(Or. 2007) (testimony of James M. Kennedy, Private Attorney) [hereinafter Kennedy] (providing
only persuasive authority regarding a legal standard to maximize profits).
55. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.077(2)(p) (West 2008). See infra Part IV at note 126 for
further discussion.
56. See supra Part II.B. Cf. Klincki v. Lundren, 695 P.2d 906, 919 (Or. 1985) (adopting a
tentative draft of ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance in a corporate opportunity case);
Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (using Principles in determining
directors fiduciary duties); Noakes v. Schoenborn, 841 P.2d 682, 685–86 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)
(using Principles in considering the question of whether a party can bring a derivative action).
57. A.L.I., supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58. Locati v. Johnson, 980 P.2d 173, 175 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
59. Id. at 175–76 (citing Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)). This
rule suggests that minority stockholders’ interests in socially and environmentally responsible
decisions could outweigh interests in shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, a corporation could
face lawsuits for a breach of a fiduciary duty if it does not seek socially and environmentally
sound decisions despite its attempts to maximize profits for the corporation and shareholders.
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corporation’s decision makers owe a duty to the shareholders, generally.60
And, even if such a duty were interpreted as it generally is, the “universal
application of the business judgment rule [including its application in Oregon]
makes the shareholder primacy norm virtually unenforceable.”61
II. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The Oregon Law’s purpose is to give corporations the ability to change
their internal governance by changing the decision rule.62 The decision rule
(shareholder primacy norm), is derived from the duty of care—a standard of
conduct that the decision makers should adhere to when making corporate
decisions.63 This duty of care dictates that the decision makers should act in
the best interests of the shareholders. Thus, the question becomes, what effect
does this shareholder primacy norm have on corporate decision makers when
making decisions? The answer: “[I]t does not matter.”64 Decision makers,
when making operational decisions, “are insulated from liability by the
business judgment rule.”65 The business judgment rule is the standard of
review by which decision makers will be judged, and absent some conflict of
interest or fraud, “their decisions will not be second-guessed in the courts.”66
With respect to whether decision makers should strictly adhere to shareholder
primacy, the generally accepted principle is that “decision makers may, but do
not have to, consider non-shareholder constituencies when making their
business decisions.”67 The obvious corollary to this rule is that decision
makers are free to deviate from the shareholder primacy norm and consider
nonshareholder constituencies when making their business decisions. They are
free to do so because of the protection provided by the business judgment rule.
The business judgment rule creates a presumption that decision makers are
acting in the corporation’s best interest. This presumption can only be rebutted
by showing some abuse of discretion.68 For example in the hallmark case of

60. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
61. A.L.I., supra note 41, at 286.
62. See Kennedy, supra note 54.
63. See generally, BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, § 9.2 (discussing shareholder wealth
maximization).
64. Id. at 414.
65. Id.
66. Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care for Better, More
Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 438, 465
(2007).
67. Id. at 462.
68. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (overruled on other grounds)
(describing the business judgment rule as giving deference, absent an abuse of discretion, to the
business decisions because such decisions constitute “a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
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Shlenksy v. Wrigley, Philip K. Wrigley, the majority shareholder of the
Chicago Cubs, also operated Wrigley Field, the Cubs’ home field.69 Wrigley
refused to install field lights for night baseball games despite the fact that every
major league team scheduled most games at night.70 A minority stockholder
brought a suit against the directors, claiming that they were losing money by
not participating in night games and, therefore, that the directors acted for
reasons unrelated to the financial interest and welfare of the Cubs.71 Wrigley
may have had valid reasons in its decisions, but the court held it was not within
the court’s province to determine the correctness of those decisions absent
elements of fraud or illegality.72 Therefore, although shareholder wealth
maximization may have led the courts to order Wrigley to participate in night
games, the court refused to second-guess because of the high deference given
to corporate decision makers by the business judgment rule.73
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,74 however, the court showed almost no regard for
a corporation’s business judgment. In Smith, Van Gorkom, the CEO, and other
directors of Trans Union solicited a merger offer, and, in doing so, acted on his
own and capriciously arrived at a $55 per share price.75 The court found that
the directors did not exercise good faith and informed judgment when they
accepted the offer of $55 per share because they took no action to substantiate
the offer nor tried to acquire more information about the acquisition.76 Thus,
the court did not recognize any “good faith informed judgment” by the
directors. Building on Wrigley, courts have and will likely continue to give
deference to the operational decisions of the corporation’s decision makers so
long as they are reasonably informed and made in good faith.

belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”); In re Tower Air, Inc., 416
F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Overcoming the presumptions of the business judgment rule on
the merits is a task.”); Halpert Enters., Inc. v. Harrison, No. 07–1144-cv, 2008 WL 4585466, at
*2 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 2008); Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1989); MHC Inv. Co.
v. Racom Corp., 323 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 2003).
69. 237 N.E.2d 776, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 777–80. Almost all major league baseball games were played at night. Id. The
court offered a possible reason for Wrigley’s decision, stating:
For example, it appears to us that the effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well
be considered by a director who was considering the patrons who would or would not
attend the games if the park were in a poor neighborhood. Furthermore, the long run
interest of the corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts
to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 781.
74. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (overruled on other grounds).
75. Id. at 866–68.
76. Id. at 876–78.
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A clearer definition of the business judgment rule was outlined in Aronson
v. Lewis.77 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court defined the business
judgment rule as:
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse
78
of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.

Quite plainly, in Delaware, the business judgment rule gives great deference to
corporate decision makers who, in their own determination, act in the
corporation’s best interests.79 Even if those decisions take into account the
corporation’s impact on communities, employees, customers, and other
nonshareholder constituents.80 Delaware courts have made it their purpose not
to interfere with directors’ decisions on questions of policy and business
management,81 and as long as the directors appear to have acted in good faith,
the courts will not interfere with directors’ discretion.82 Not surprisingly, the
Oregon courts have applied a similar rule when faced with opportunities to
second-guess decision makers.
A.

Oregon’s Business Judgment Rule

Similar to the general business judgment rule, Oregon’s rule acts as a
shield from unprofitable or unpopular decisions made in the course of business
so long as the directors acted in good faith, with due care, and within their
authority.83 The Oregon statute regarding director duty of care provides:

77. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
78. Id. at 812 (internal citations omitted); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66
(Del. 2000). The court found that the “directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act
in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a
grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably
available.” Id.
79. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 805.
80. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that
directors are able to consider various factors when making decisions including impact on nonshareholder constituents, employees, suppliers, customers, and the community).
81. Mercantile Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 154 A. 457, 461 (Del. Ch. 1931).
82. See Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973); Kaplan v.
Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977).
83. See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977). This is similar to the way that other
jurisdictions handle the business judgment rule. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357(2)–(4) (West
2003). The standard for corporate directors in the Oregon statute provides:
(2) In discharging the duties of a director, a director is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports or statement including financial statements and other financial date,
if prepared or presented by:
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A director shall discharge the duties of a director, including the duties as a
member of a committee, in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances and in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
84
corporation.

This duty of care follows Delaware and the ALI’s standard and supports the
notion that, so long as the decision makers are carrying out their duties in good
faith manner, they will be insulated from liability and the courts will abstain
from reviewing their decisions.
This is evidenced by Zidell v. Zidell, where the Oregon Supreme Court
analyzed the duties of corporate directors and the proper role of courts in
overseeing corporate policies.85 The court held that for the judiciary to
interfere in a corporate decision, there must be evidence that the decision
amounted to fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion on the part of corporate
officials authorized to make the decision.86 The court stated that it was “not
the province of the court to act as general manager of a private corporation or
to assume the regulation of its internal affairs.”87 In other words, Zidell sets a
high burden of proof that must be shown to penetrate the deference allowed by
Oregon courts.88

(a) One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(b) Legal counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters the director
reasonably believes are within the person’s professional or expert competence;
or
(c) A committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a member if
the director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
(3) A director is not acting in good faith if the director has knowledge concerning the
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (2) of this
section unwarranted.
(4) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any
action, if the director performed the duties of the director’s office in compliance with
this section.
Id.
84. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.357(1) (West 2003).
85. Ziddell, 560 P.2d at 1089.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Gay v. Gay’s Super Markets, 343 A.2d 577 (Me. 1975)).
88. See id. at 419 (“If there are plausible business reasons supportive of the decision of the
board of directors, and such reasons can be given credence, a Court will not interfere with a
corporate board’s right to make that decision.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Naito v.
Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that the corporation’s management
and directors are usually in the best position to determine the factors that go into deciding a
corporation’s needs).
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A more recent case, Crandon Capital Partners v. Shelk,89 defined the
business judgment rule as a “presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.”90 The court further explained, “A hallmark of the business
judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
board if the latter’s decision can be attributed to any rational business
purpose.”91 Crandon effectively established the business judgment rule in
Oregon as the same rule Delaware courts use in interpreting and deferring to a
corporation’s business judgment.92 Therefore, although supporters of the
Oregon Law argued that Oregon lacked such a standard, Oregon seems to have
a rather well-defined business judgment rule that protects decision makers who
implement environmentally and socially responsible policies.93
III. OREGON’S LAW
Corporate law is, effectively, the set of rules that controls the decision
making structure of the corporation.94 Proponents of corporate social
responsibility argue that corporate law in the United States is “used almost
exclusively to protect shareholders (or the firm itself).”95 Therefore, other
nonshareholder constituents or “stakeholders” such as employees,
communities, etc., must rely upon “external” regulations such as
environmental regulations, disclosure requirements, or consumer protection
laws.96 Through the passing of a recent law, Oregon took the first step at
changing a corporation’s internal law or decision rule to consider the interests
of nonshareholder constituencies.
Oregon corporations can now make “green” more than just a mission
statement. A new law amending Oregon’s corporation code97 provides that a
corporation’s articles of incorporation may set forth “[a] provision authorizing
or directing the corporation to conduct the business of the corporation in a
manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.”98 The provision, if

89. 181 P.3d 773 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
90. Id. at 782 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984)) (internal quotations
omitted).
91. Id. (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)) (internal
quotations omitted).
92. See supra note 56.
93. See Sneirson, supra note 15, at 1019.
94. Smith, supra note 22, at 989.
95. Greenfield, supra note 8, at 951.
96. Id.
97. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (West 2008). The law was passed in June 2007 and took
effect on January 1, 2008.
98. Id.
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adopted, requires all corporate decisions to be environmentally and socially
responsible.99 The Law was enacted to protect corporate decision makers, who
desire to make environmentally and socially responsible decisions, because the
assumption was that such decisions could make the corporation vulnerable as
they are considered deviations from the supposed norm.100 To that end, and to
the extent the purpose was to allow corporations to affirmatively declare their
decision rule as one different from shareholder primacy, the Law is successful.
The initial problem, however, is that the Law fails to define
“environmentally and socially responsible.”101 This problem is exacerbated by
a noted paucity of sources for a corporation to follow in determining what it
means to be socially and environmentally responsible.102 Nonetheless,
decision makers will be forced to interpret for themselves what it means to
engage in environmentally and socially responsible conduct. What happens
when this interpretation is not shared by the shareholders of the corporation?
Ultimately, the courts will decide, and the failure to carefully define and
articulate what the corporation means by socially and environmentally
responsible behavior creates an uncertainty that places the company at risk.103
If a corporation assumes this risk and adopts the new provision, it is potentially
opening the door to shareholder suits.104
A.

Purpose and Rationale of the Oregon Law

The Oregon law’s apparent purpose, to allow for decision makers to
account for nonshareholder interests, incorporates the ALI’s Principles of

99. Id.; see also infra Part IV.
100. See Andy Giegerich, Some Biz Lawyers Worry Over Sustainability Effort, PORTLAND
BUS. J., Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2008/04/21/focus7.html?ana
=from_rss. “The Purpose was to avoid any risk that might be left for the board of directors that
chooses to operate in a way that recognizes environmental and sustainable goals . . . [i]t creates a
safe harbor for them. Yet anyone who doesn’t want to doesn’t have to under existing law.” Id.
101. See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047 (West 2008).
102. See JEFFREY HOLLENDER & STEPHEN FENICHELL, WHAT MATTERS MOST 29 (2004)
(stating that there is not one single definition of corporate social responsibility); ADRIAN
HENRIQUES, CORPORATE TRUTH 27 (2007); JOHN J. KIRTON & M.J. TREBILCOCK, HARD
CHOICES, SOFT LAW 191 (2007); WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, CORPORATION, BE GOOD! 44 (2006);
JOHN C. DERNBACH, ENVIRONEMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY 550 (2002).
103. Practitioners have already expressed concern over the new law in Oregon. See Perkins
Coie, Recent Oregon Legislation Addresses Corporate Social Responsibility, PERKINSCOIE.COM,
Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?publication=1553&op=updates
(arguing that social responsibility provisions should be specific, not general, and that social
responsibility legislation may encourage shareholder activists); see also infra Part IV.
104. Coie, supra note 103.
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Corporate Governance standard involving a corporation’s objective and
conduct.105 The relevant portion of the ALI principles provides that:
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of the business: (1) Is obliged, to the same extent as
a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law; (2) May take into
account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to
the responsible conduct of business; and (3) May devote a reasonable amount
of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic
106
purposes.

The incorporation of ALI’s essential principles into Oregon Law aims to
protect corporate decisions considered to be environmentally and socially
responsible.107 As noted above, the rationale for such a provision is attributed
to the supposed deficiency of Oregon case law in defining the business
judgment rule, which protects decision makers who deviate from the
shareholder primacy norm, and thus, accommodates environmentally and
socially responsible decision-making.108 During debate on the bill, proponents
argued that an absence of a strong business judgment rule made socially and
environmentally responsible corporate decisions vulnerable to an assumed duty
owed by corporations to maximize shareholder value.109 In other words,
proponents argued that courts might determine that socially and
environmentally responsible decisions run afoul of a corporation’s duty to
maximize profit, which chills a corporation from engaging in socially and
environmentally responsible policies.110 Not only is this a false premise, as
argued in this Article, but it turns out that profitability and environmental and
social responsibility are not necessarily perpendicular.
B.

Profitability and Sustainability

The main justification for the Oregon law is a fear that corporations
making decisions to act in an environmentally and socially responsible way
could be subject to lawsuits because those decisions do not necessarily equate
to actual profits.111 By electing to be an environmentally and socially
responsible corporation, the decision makers presumably feel more at liberty to
make decisions that will further this objective as opposed to those decisions
that will only produce the maximum profit. As Professor Sneirson noted, the

105. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1.
106. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
53 (1994) (emphasis added).
107. See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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notion that environmentally and socially responsible business is unprofitable
may be more perception than reality.112
The discussion of environmentally and socially responsible corporate
behavior is more commonly covered under the umbrella of “sustainability.”113
Sustainability, more commonly discussed among humanitarians and moralists,
has recently, and quite abruptly, become a part of the vocabulary of many of
the world’s most successful corporations.114 In fact, many corporations and
their directors are “recognizing that economic and social returns are now
coming together to satisfy shareholders and stakeholders alike.”115
This notion is further substantiated under what has become known as the
“double bottom line.”116 Double bottom line is the concept that “profits” have
both a financial and social component.117 Moreover, the maximization of
shareholder wealth can be accomplished not only by monetary revenue, but
also by creating positive externalities and reducing negative externalities of the
corporation’s production.118 This notion is very much consistent with the
holding in Paramount, that directors can consider the impact on
nonshareholder constituents including employees, suppliers, customers,
creditors, and the community generally.119
As noted by commentator Pete Engardio, there has been a significant
investment in the sustainability agenda.120 Not only in the form of investment
into companies meeting the criteria for being “sustainable,” but also into
research to satisfy rising investor demand.121 In addition to creating
“sustainable” products, corporations are finding investor demand and are now
including reports on their “sustainable” efforts in their annual reports to
shareholders.122 Therefore, corporations are certainly seeing a payoff for going

112. Sneirson, supra note 15, at 991.
113. The lack of material defining “environmentally and socially responsible” could be
problematic. See supra Part II.
114. Pete Engardio, Beyond the Green Corporation, BUS. WK., Jan. 29, 2007, at 50, 52.
115. Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the
Business Judgment Rule Protects A Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 628 (2008). Moreover, “They are ensuring that these groups no longer
have to be at odds with each other.” Id.
116. Id. at 633.
117. Id. The double bottom line is achieved by “harnessing innovation, people, and resources
to develop an enterprise that is self-sustaining, makes money, and solves a social problem.” Id.
118. Id. at 635.
119. Paramount Commc’n. Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989).
120. Engardio, supra note 114, at 56–57.
121. Id.
122. See Kerr, supra note 115, at 644 (citing William Rosenzweig, Double Bottom Line
Project Report: Assessing Social Impact In Double Bottom Line Ventures (2004) (Center for
Responsible Business Working Paper Series, Paper 13, 2004), available at http://repositories.
cdlib.org/crb/wps/13.
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green. And, as Unilever CEO Patrick Cescau puts it, “[It’s] about . . . growth
and innovation. In the future, it will be the only way to do business.”123 Thus,
the idea that shareholder primacy and environmental and social responsibility
are at odds and corporations are not free to internalize nonshareholder interests
is false. Moreover, changing the internal law of the corporation to mandate
environmental and social responsibility may be the corporate governance
equivalent of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. Decision makers will
be constrained by this decision rule and deviations will be met with potential
lawsuits from inside and outsides the corporation.
IV. LITIGATION
Adopting the provision provided by the Oregon Law that the corporation
will act in an environmentally and socially responsible manner will have the
positive effect of changing the law of the corporation; decision makers will be
bound to act within this framework. The effect of this is two-fold: first, the
potential revival of the ultra vires law suit; and second, possibly giving
standing to nonshareholder to enjoin the corporation from acting in a way that
is not considered environmentally and socially responsible.
A.

Ultra Vires

Generally, the law of a corporation is derived from three separate sources:
(1) The requirements set out in the corporation’s charters and bylaws; (2) the
statutory law of the state in which the corporation is incorporated; and (3) case
law.124 Traditionally, the doctrine of ultra vires “limited the authority of
corporations to the purposes and activities named in the corporate charter.”125
Purposes for this limitation range in theories of a contractual relationship
between shareholder and corporation126 to an interest in limiting the effects of

123. Id. at 632.
124. Stout, supra note 37, at 168; see also 7A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Ch. 40 Ultra Vires §§ 3399–3579
(1997).
125. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality, 87
VA. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (2001) (citing JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 60 (1972) (“[T]he general powers of a
corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”)). Professor
Greenfield goes on to state, “According to an early nineteenth-century treatise, a corporation is
confined to the sphere of action limited by the terms and intention of the charter.” Id. at 1380
n.68 (internal quotations omitted).
126. Id. at 1304. It can be argued that the ultra vires doctrine exists as to enforce a
contractual agreement between shareholders and directors regarding the purpose of the
corporation. This ultimately protects the shareholders from those in charge of the corporation
changing the business beyond the initial agreement. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION
LAW § 1.1.3 (2000).
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large corporations on society.127 Purposes of the limitation notwithstanding,
ultra vires generally meant to limit the corporation to only those powers
enumerated by the charter and bylaws and not to limit the corporation from
“illegal acts.”128
Once prominent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
ultra vires129 doctrine has long since been declared dead.130 Before the modern
era of corporate law, corporations were usually only created by an act of the
legislature for a specific purpose, such as constructing a railroad.131 This
charter which gives a corporation the power to act for a specific purpose also
limited its ability to engage in activities that did not further that purpose.132 If
the corporation went beyond its enumerated purpose, shareholders had the
right to enjoin the corporation’s ultra vires acts that were beyond its
enumerated powers.133 Limiting corporations to specific purposes acted as a
check that held corporations accountable, which ultimately limited their
economic influence in society.134 Modern corporate law, however, has evolved
in such a way that these shareholder checks on corporate acts are effectively no
longer available. Courts and legislatures started expanding the limitation of
corporate existence, which dissolved much of the limitation on corporate

127. Harry Rajak, Judicial Control: Corporations and The Decline of Ultra Vires, 26
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 9, 18 (1995); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–49 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
128. 7A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 124, § 3400; see also State Savings & Loan Ass’n v.
Bryant, 81 P.2d 116, 129 (Or. 1938) (distinguishing the act of the corporation that was illegal as
opposed to ultra vires); but see Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1314 (arguing the opposite view).
129. The term is commonly defined as follows: “Unauthorized; beyond the scope of power
allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1559 (8th ed.
2004).
130. Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporation of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming
Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 900 (2007); see Stephen J. Leacock, The Rise
and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United States, United Kingdom, and Commonwealth
Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A Triumph of Experience Over Logic, 5 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L.J. 67, 94 (2007) (“[A]bolition of the ultra vires doctrine probably comes closest to being
complete . . . .”).
131. See Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, (1875) 7 L.R.E. & I. App. 653; see also
Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts
of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 81–83 (1984); Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1280
(describing how law schools teach that the doctrine is “dead or at least deathly ill”).
132. GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 21–22.
133. Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1282. The doctrine of ultra vires acted as a device for
corporations to avoid contracts or it could result in a corporation losing contracts. This aspect of
the doctrine, however, is not relevant to the discussion of this article.
134. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548–49 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Greenfield,
supra note 125, 1302–03.
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activities.135 One example occurred when legislatures started allowing
corporations to provide a list of their business purposes, which ultimately led
corporations to provide exaggerated lists for all types of purposes.136 Finally,
the legislatures established that corporations could provide their purposes to be
for all lawful business in order to avoid the fruitlessness of creating an
extensive list of purposes.137
In Delaware, section 101(b) of the Delaware Corporation Code states, “A
corporation may be incorporated . . . to conduct or promote any lawful
business or purposes . . . .”138 Specific to this article, Oregon adopted the
language of the Model Business Corporation Act.139 In fact, almost all states
permit or require incorporators to define the purposes of formation in a
corporation and generally such purposes are for “any lawful purposes.”140
Therefore, as corporate law has changed so has the doctrine of ultra vires, and
presumably all that remains outside the scope of a corporation’s power or
purpose is unlawful business actions or activities that are not directed toward
any business goal.141
Current Oregon corporation law provides that “Every corporation
incorporated . . . has the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a
more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.”142 Such a
limited purpose could include the direction that corporations “conduct the
business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially
responsible . . . .”143 By placing this limitation in the articles of incorporation,
the incorporators could be resurrecting the once-dead ultra vires lawsuit.
B.

Shareholder Litigation

Changing the internal law of the corporation could potentially have some
negative ramifications. The law transitions from the very vague “for all lawful
135. GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 22; Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 214 (1985); Joel Seligman, A Brief
History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 251 (1976).
136. GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 23.
137. Id.
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (West 2001).
139. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.074(1) (West 2003); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2002)
(“Every corporation incorporated under this chapter has the purpose of engaging in any lawful
business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.”) (emphasis
added).
140. See Stout, supra note 37, at 169; Greenfield, supra note 125, at 1317 (“Articles of
incorporation of specific companies tend to track the language of the applicable statutes and thus
bolster the notion that the corporations themselves consider their authority as being limited to
lawful purposes . . . .”).
141. See GEVURTZ, supra note 126, at 23.
142. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.074 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
143. Id. § 60.047(2)(e).
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purposes” or unenforceable shareholder primacy norm to the very specific
requirement that the decision makers operate the business in an
environmentally and socially responsible manner. The rise of general
incorporation laws has eroded the ultra vires doctrine. The Oregon Law,
however, effectively reverses the “all lawful purposes” provision found in
corporate charters. By electing the provision provided by the Oregon Law, a
corporation is binding itself to conduct business in a specific way. If a
corporation fails to act in a socially and environmentally responsible way, a
shareholder could bring a suit seeking to enjoin the corporation from its ultra
vires acts—acts that are not socially or environmentally responsible. The
protection once provided by the business judgment rule is now gone. Decision
makers are, under the current perceived norm and the protection of the
business judgment rule, free to make decisions they deem to be in the best
interest of the shareholders. By electing the provision provided by the Oregon
Law, they are binding themselves to a specific decision rule: A decision rule
that specifically constrains the decision makers from making any decision that
is not considered environmentally and socially responsible.
This is troublesome because there is no singular definition of
environmentally and socially responsible. The inherently subjective standard
leaves a determination of what is “responsible,” “environmental,” or even
“social” to each individual. The corporation is leaving the determination to
shareholders who may disagree with the corporation in their definition or in
their application of environmentally and socially responsible behavior.
Furthermore, when disagreement does arise between shareholders and decision
makers with respect to what is environmentally and socially responsible, the
corporation must avail itself to the interpretation of the courts. Perhaps, this is
a very dangerous position compared to whatever benefits that may be
perceived from electing such a provision.
C. Nonshareholder Litigation
Generally, nonshareholder constituency statutes are permissive insomuch
as they allow corporate decision makers to consider nonshareholder interests,
but do not require them to do so.144 Given that the statutes do not require
decision makers to consider nonshareholder interests, it is unlikely that
nonshareholders would have standing to enforce them.145 Incorporating the
requirement for environmental and social responsibility into the articles of
incorporation changes the permissive nature of the statutes. Adopting the
environmentally and socially responsible provision would bind the corporate
144. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 971, 987 (1992).
145. Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing
a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1233–34 (1991).
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decision makers to act in such a manner, exclusively and without consideration
to shareholder or other interests. This potentially gives nonshareholders,
environmental activist groups, human rights groups, etc., the opportunity to
enjoin the corporation form acting in a way that they consider to be in violation
of the law of the corporation. The definition of “environmentally and socially
responsible” becomes more unruly with the addition of nonshareholders to the
game. Under current law, Oregon corporations are free to consider
nonshareholder interests in making decisions, but are not constrained in doing
so.146 The mandatory nature of the language provided in the Oregon Law
could potentially leave corporations conflicted as to who their master is and
vulnerable to lawsuits from shareholders and nonshareholders alike.
CONCLUSION
Professor Greenfield argues that “corporate law should not presume,
without strong arguments, to prohibit corporate decision makers from taking
into account the very societal interests that the corporation is ultimately meant
to serve in the first place.”147 Corporations “will not, through their own
generosity, internalize the external costs of their decisions or keep an eye on
the social harms they produce.”148 The solution would then be to change the
internal law of the corporation and shift the present decision rule to one that
mandates the consideration of nonshareholder interests. To this end, the
Oregon Law is successful. The language of the Oregon Law, however,
presents other unique problems.
Corporate decision makers are, pursuant to their duty of care, required to
act in the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation, generally.
Although many have interpreted this duty as a duty to maximize shareholder
wealth, no such duty has been enforced by the courts. In fact, the case most
widely cited in this regard, Dodge v Ford, only speaks to this duty in dicta.149
To the extent that decision makers are required to follow this decision rule,
they are insulated by the business judgment rule. Therefore, the Oregon Law
does nothing more than fight back the great boogeyman of corporate law.
And, in doing so, it makes the corporation more vulnerable than it was before.
The corporation’s mandate, through its articles of incorporation, that it will
act in an “environmentally and socially responsible manner,” creates
unnecessary risk. While it is true that it will change the internal law of the
corporation and shift the norm to one that requires the corporation to consider
nonshareholder constituencies, it is opening the door to a potential flood of
litigation over what it means to be “environmentally and socially responsible.”
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra Part III.
Greensfield, supra note 8, at 965.
Id. at 963.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
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The primary issue here is the Oregon legislature’s failure to define
“environmentally and socially responsible.” Through this omission, the
legislature creates a scenario whereby the corporation, the shareholders, and
the courts will each be allowed to interpret and define what it means to be
environmentally and socially responsible. Without adopting the provision that
the corporation will act in an environmentally and socially responsible manner,
the decision makers are free to consider such interests, so why adopt the
provision and take the unnecessary risk?

